**The future of statecraft under Azadism** **Vichaars** - [[Sikhs & City States]] - [[Building a Global Network of Stans for Soft Power]] **Vichaar Areas** - [[Small Scale Stans]] - [[Sikh Spaces]] ## What is a Stan? As per Azadism, a “Stan” refers to any area under the jurisdiction of a constitution or contract of sorts. Modern day examples include Hindustan, Pakistan, Afghanistan etc. (and also any nation-state that doesn’t end in the word “-stan”). However, they do not need to be limited to modern nation-states run by _taxing_ _authorities_ (central governments), and instead could refer to any community or organisation of people, even those based on voluntary associations on a private (independent/non-state) basis. Examples of this can include housing associations, communes, and even businesses! In its broadest sense, a “Stan”, therefore, is any organisation or community of people who come together, pool resources and acquire territory (and this does not have to be large or contiguous) to pursue a shared objective. ## What is Stanistan? Literally meaning _land-of-lands_, the _Stanistan_ model is a method of organising communities that seeks to respect diversity and provide avenues for individuals to establish their own experiments in statecraft. Instead of relying upon a single central government micromanaging and imposing one uniform system upon all citizens involuntarily, this approach decentralises power and offers people the freedom to join governance structures of their own choosing or to create entirely new governments, each with its own unique, private constitutions or contractual arrangements. Each contract sets out in clear terms the specific rules and arrangements by which a Stan operates, including any minimum requirements, laws, or expectations of its members. Some Stans may opt to charge a fee or rent in lieu of traditional taxation, while others might devise alternative means of generating income to cover their costs. It is left to each Stan to determine these mechanisms for itself, striving to achieve a balance between human satisfaction and economic viability. The principle of “freedom of exit”, upheld by the administrators of the Stanistan (either a central government, or preferentially, an Azadist conception for a modernised Misl system in the long-run), ensures that individuals are never trapped within a contract that no longer aligns with their needs or aspirations. People remain free to depart and apply to join another Stan better suited to their circumstances. Because human preferences are inherently diverse, it naturally follows that a wide variety of governance options will arise over time. Some people may wish to live democratically, while others may favour a monarchy. Certain individuals will prize a capitalistic framework, whereas others may prefer a more communistic arrangement. Some Stans might focus on education and research, while others dedicate themselves to leisure, creative pursuits, or retirement. Some citizens may gravitate towards vibrant cities, while others find contentment in small communes. Human beings differ in their preferences, values, and ambitions, and attempting to impose a single system upon all is not only impractical but also deeply misguided. Azadism, therefore, advocates for a _system of systems._ Freedom is inherently the ability to choose between multiple options. The more options there are, the more freedom there is. Stanistan is thus a method of offering people more choice. In this way, Stanistan establishes a _market for governance_ wherein numerous competing offerings emerge, each experimenting with its own philosophy and organisational model to create communities in which people are willing to participate. If a Stan is able to provide opportunities or a quality of life that resonates with prospective members, it will attract positive immigration, bringing with it skills, talents, and resources that help the project flourish further. Conversely, if a Stan is poorly designed, unsustainable, or fails to meet the expectations of its participants, it will struggle to attract new members. Existing residents will likely depart, and in time, the founders themselves may withdraw, releasing resources and space for others to attempt more promising experiments. Failure is a necessary part of progress. As they say in the start-up world: “fail fast”. This is because it is through making mistakes one is granted the opportunities to learn new lessons, both for themselves and others. When they try again, they do so equipped with greater experience, thereby improving their chances of success. Having an environment in which such failures can occur in localised contexts is crucial. Instead of putting all our eggs in one basket with a single, central government, a failure in this context would be on far smaller scales. Contrast this with failures on the scales we observe with large, nation-state governments today, the effects of their shortcomings are also of a similar scale, if not wider. This approach diversifies risk and encourages continual experimentation, establishing a system akin to natural selection. Over time, as a multitude of models are trialled and refined, ineffective or unsustainable systems are naturally filtered out, while those that prove themselves resilient and beneficial endure — as determined by the people, not a central authority deciding on their behalf. Through this rapid pace of experimentation and the abundance of lessons learned, ever-improving models of governance can emerge and take root. Individuals are protected by the existence of plentiful alternatives, secure in the knowledge that if one Stan falls short of their expectations, many others remain open to them. This abundance of options means no one is compelled to endure an unsatisfactory system simply because there is nowhere else to go. The freedom to leave and the ease of finding or creating more suitable communities ensure that people retain agency over their circumstances. Even in the event of a Stan’s failure, residents can relocate without fear of losing their rights or livelihoods, as there is always another opportunity awaiting them elsewhere. Indeed, if someone believes they can design a more effective or fulfilling model, they need only raise sufficient funds, purchase a parcel of land, and put their ideas into practice. This could be done perhaps as a group or with the backing of investors, for which they’ll need to produce a solid business plan or _Stan development plan_, and a compelling pitch. New developers may want to start small, validate their ideas and grow. Seasoned developers, with the wealth and experience behind them, could jump into the development of larger projects. The choice is theirs, so long as they are able to satisfy the success metrics: quality of life, opportunity and fulfilment of purpose. In this way, innovation and experimentation in statecraft are not restricted to a privileged few but are open to all who possess the vision and determination to build something better. While the Stanistan approach represents the culmination of Azadism’s commitment to political and economic freedom, it is by no means the only organisational framework the philosophy endorses. Stanistan should be understood as a long-term ideal towards which societies can progressively aspire to, and by which they may guide policy development and reform. In the shorter to medium term, Azadism supports the establishment of a limited central government, founded upon a robust constitution and granting a high degree of autonomy to its federal units; essentially, a highly federalist constitutional republic. This framework would also encourage the emergence of numerous Special Economic Zones (SEZs), a type of Stan designed to attract wealth, investment, and entrepreneurship from across the world so that such resources are employed, spent, and reinvested within a domestic economy rather than flowing elsewhere. Once society reaches a sufficient level of development, potentially measured by achieving clear targets such as minimum thresholds of prosperity, substantial reductions in absolute poverty, and consistent standards of security, the degree of federalism can be intensified further. At this stage, rather than defining the boundaries of federal units through fixed, centrally decreed borders, the delineation of territories could increasingly be determined by the market. In other words, the private (non-State) sector would be able to purchase plots of land and establish territories governed by their own distinct systems. This transition marks an important distinction between nationalised cities and privatised cities. Nationalised cities, managed directly by the central or federal government, tend to exhibit the typical inefficiencies of bureaucratic administration, often lagging in responsiveness and quality. They are paid for regardless of performance through taxation (an involuntary payment), meaning the same incentives to maintain quality are simply not there. By contrast, privatised cities, operated as independent Stans, compete to attract residents by offering superior services, infrastructure, and governance. If they do or cannot, then they are outcompeted by those that can. Their ability to persist is wholly dependent on whether they can provide a product that others are willing to pay for voluntarily. Because these privately managed territories are more responsive to the needs and preferences of their inhabitants, they naturally become more desirable places to live. Over time, as people increasingly choose to reside in such environments, the relevance of conventional federal state boundaries begins to diminish. Instead, the borders of these autonomous Stans, each with their own constitutions, laws, and policies, become the meaningful lines that define the boundaries between jurisdictions (Stans). In this way, the traditional notion of fixed federal borders would gradually phase out in favour of flexible, market-driven Stan borders. Each Stan would have the authority to determine its own immigration and citizenship policies, tailoring participation to suit its unique character and objectives. Through this process of what could be described as “federalism on steroids”, society would organically evolve over time, eventually satisfying the definition of a Stanistan. At this stage, the central government’s role would be reduced to maintaining the essential functions of security, defence, and justice — primarily to guarantee people’s freedom of exit and their right to participate exclusively in Stans of their own choosing. It would retain the responsibility to intervene where necessary to address negative externalities, prevent harm to non-consenting third parties, and settle disputes in impartial courts. In essence, the central government’s function would be to uphold something called the Non-Aggression Principle (NAP): the freedom to live however you want to, provided you do not impede the right for others to do the same. Importantly, even these core services of security, defence, and justice would no longer be solely the domain of the central government. Stans could develop their own systems to provide these services directly or contract with independent entities specialising in such functions. In addition, private sector providers of justice, policing, and military protection, working in conjunction with insurance firms, would emerge to offer alternative options to those potentially dissatisfied with the standard of central government provision. At this point, citizens should have the freedom to opt out not only of centrally provided services but also of tax contributions funding them. Just as nationalised cities eventually become optional in favour of superior alternatives, so too would the central government’s services and institutions become merely one choice among many. Over time, the former central government would effectively become simply another service provider that individuals may select or decline as they see fit. Therefore, a government that is set up to administer the progression towards a Stanistan should see itself less as shepherds herding and protecting citizens as if they were their cattle, and more as facilitators who enable people to become their own sovereign, self-autonomous rulers. The Sikh project started by Guru Nanak in 1469 culminated in the emergence of the Khalsa Panth by Guru Gobind Singh in 1699 as an Indo-Persian synthesis. This two-hundred-year endeavour established a society steeped in non-dual spiritual philosophy, expressed through loving devotion to a creator present within and as the creation itself. Sikhs (disciples) of the Guru were cultivated to transcend enmity and hatred, and recognise divinity in all. It was on these foundations a political dimension developed. One where liberty was prioritised and tyranny was criticised and contested. Our first Guru was not just a passive Saint, but an explorer and pioneer who established his own townsteads, eventually evolving into cities. A practice that was further expanded upon by his predecessors. When Guru Gobind Singh raised the Khalsa, he gave it a distinct identity as an order of spiritual-warriors. By further establishing the Khalsa itself as the next Guru, alongside the Guru Granth Sahib, he imbued it with his own purpose to fight tyranny through righteous battle (_Dharam Yudh_), and engage in statecraft (_Raajniti_). Alongside martial training, he gathered the greatest minds of the time at his _Anandpur Darbar_ (royal court) to provide his Khalsa with a political education so that they may inherit the Guruship with competence. Unlike the ascetics and saints who retreated into remote areas or lived in fear of tyrants, the Khalsa were trained to become fearless advocates for justice and liberty. They were taught to express their spirituality in practical ways, to help humanity. Through this their mission became clear, to establish a _Khalsa Raaj_: an environment in which those seeking _Mukti_ (spiritual liberation) are able to do so free from tyranny (political liberation). Therefore, the Guru’s Sikhi is the pursuit of both spiritual and political liberty. It is for this reason why Sikhs, and in particular the Guru Khalsa, whom the Sikhs should be a support system for (as they were during the human Guru’s times) have a duty to engage in statecraft today and pursue the cause of liberty. We should reject our current, ahistorical insular nature and once again, integrate and embed ourselves in diverse societies as problem-solvers and innovators. Walking in the footsteps of our Gurus, Sikhs must become builders of new cities and communities, creating environments superior to those administered by nationalised systems. To defend these environments and ensure that everyone’s rights under the NAP are protected, the Khalsa should _Mislise_ once again, forming a decentralised network of modernised Misls, fully capable of delivering security, defence, and justice. What if _Stanification_ does not succeed as intended? Even in that case, the outcome would be far from a failure. Through a solid attempt at it, you would still have established a federalist republic governed by a robust constitution, guaranteeing a high degree of autonomy for its regions and a deep respect for individual liberty. In effect, the worst-case scenario of attempting Stanification is the creation of a society already more decentralised and freer than the vast majority of nation-states today. This means that even if the full vision of Stanistan were never realised, the effort itself would still result in a meaningful improvement over the systems that currently prevail. Perhaps a more enlightened, liberty-loving society of the future would be able to pursue more _Azaadi_ upon these foundations when the time is right. --- Read Next | [[Small Scale Stans]]